Abstract: The focus of this paper is on those elements of the
similar kinds of services, may have different faces: telecommunications operators may offer audio-visual programming over their network, broadcasters may provide data services over their networks, cable operators may provide a range of telecommunication services (cf. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1997, p. 1) . Up to the present time the most relevant evolution and adaptation of such platform independence is that of the transmission control protocol / Internet protocol (TCP / IP). TCP / IP allows information packets to be transported across different networks, despite differences in bandwidth, delay, and error properties associated with different transport media (e.g. fiber, radio, satellite) (cf. FRISHMANN, 2001, p. 4) .
The Internet as the prime driver of convergence is displacing traditional isolated computer networks, it is providing an alternative means of offering telecommunication services (e. g. Internet telephony), and, moreover, the Internet is also becoming a significant platform for broadcasting services. In addition, technological convergence makes possible innovative services which combine product characteristics from the traditionally distinct branches of telecommunications, IT and the media, thereby enlarging the scope of voice, data, mult imedia and audiovisual services.
The role of government interventions and regulations has strongly different traditions in the media, IT and telecommunication sectors. The media industry is traditionally attributed a function as the bearer of social, cultural and ethical values within our society. Whereas private communication has traditionally been unregulated, broadcast content has traditionally been regulated to some extent (public broadcast). The computer / IT industry developed in an unregulated manner, under the application of the general competition law. In contrast, the telecommunications sector had for many years been organised as a legal monopoly.
In the meantime the recent process of gradually opening the telecommunications markets to competition has been coming to an end. Since 1998 in most countries of the world market entry has been allowed to all parts of the telecommunic ations networks, including both cable-based infrastructure and telephone services. Nevertheless, sector specific regulations still play an important role. In many countries the telecommunications sector is still a heavy-handedly regulated sector. Remaining sector specific regulations concern not only technical regulations (e.g. allocation of radio frequencies) or politically desired universal services objectives, but there also exists a complex set of ex ante regulations of end user tariffs, interconnection and access charges in long distance as well as local networks (cf. . These different approaches of government i nterventions may be challenged by the convergence of the telecommunications, media and IT sectors. On the one hand convergence may outpace existing sector-specific regimes. On the other hand sector-specific regulation may even be extended in the future to include markets not yet regulated, e.g. mobile telephony and new markets, e.g. Internet services (cf. UNGERER, 2000, pp. 227) . The question arises how to achieve the proper role of government intervention in a comprehensive institutional framework, leaving markets as much freedom as possible.
Internet periphery versus Internet service provision
Internet service provision requires several complementary elements belonging to the Internet periphery, which are viable on their own, even in the absence of the Internet. In contrast to the elements of the Internet periphery, the elements of Internet service provision are an inalienable part of the Internet and would not exist without the Internet (see fig. 1 ).
Fig. 1: Internet periphery versus Internet service provision
Terminal equipment (PCs, cellular phones) can be used either without or with access to the Internet, although obviously the use of the Internet is not possible without any terminal equipment. Content (including broadband) may be provided via the Internet (e. g. video on demand, customized music and video libraries), but there are also other distribution channels available (e. g. cinemas, traditional video libraries, traditional broadcasting). Internet service provision would be possible even without any content provision, by specialising on interactive services (e. g. e-mail). Access to the Internet may take place via local telecommunications networks, cable networks or wireless local loop. In order to provide Internet services, capacity of long distance telecommunications networks (bandwidth) is required. Although in the meantime investments in long distance telecommunications infrastructure are strongly motivated by Internet demand, telecommunication transmission capacity has many alternative purposes. The focus of this paper is on those elements of the Internet periphery and Internet service provision which are strongly based on telecommunications, in particular Internet access (section 3) and Internet backbone (section 4). Fundamental networking and internetworking may be divided into Internet-governance (IP number assignments and domain name service), and Internet backbone services; the latter is considered in section 4.2. There are many other highly relevant questions related to the Internet, which are not the subject of this paper; for example: is there still a future role for content regulation, given the enormous scope of content production and distribution in the converging markets? (cf. MESTMÄCKER, 2001) . Is there still a serious applications barrier to entry problem in the microprocessor market, given the enormous potential for middleware threats due to innovations on the browser market? (cf. ECONO-MIDES, 2000; FISHER, 2000; SIDAK, 2001) . What are the potentials and limits for self-regulation in the organisation of access to IP number assignments and domain name systems? (cf. KESAN, SHAH, 2001; HILLEBRAND, BÜL-LINGEN, 2001 ). How is Internet safety (cf. MÜLLER, RANNENBERG, 1999) . and the enforcement of property rights within the Internet to be guaranteed? (cf. MÖSCHEL, 1999; ENGEL, 1999) .
Access to the Internet
Access to the Internet requires a connection between the Internet user and the interface to the Internet (ISP point of presence/POP). Public switched access to the Internet primarily requires access to a local telecommunications network. In addition, a (long-distance) link between the originating (local) network and the ISP is required.
1 Several access technologies exist: copper, fiber optics, two-way cable TV infrastructure (CATV network), powerline communication and radio in the loop. One may differentiate between narrowband and broadband Internet access. Narrowband Internet access takes place on two-pairs copper cables via analog modem and ISDN (integrated services digital network). Broadband Internet access can be provided either by upgrading two-pair copper cables by means of xDSL (digital subscriber line) technologies -the most popular one being ADSL (asymmetric DSL) technology -, CATV based broadband Internet access, as well as broadband wireless technology (e. g. UMTS). Convergence and platform independence, however, does not mean that these broadband access technologies have the same cost-characteristics, and they also have different access quality attributes (e. g. mobility, reliability, start-up speed etc.).
There are particularly strong quality differences between low-speed access (narrowband) and high-speed access (broadband "The importance of dial-up Internet is crucial. Analysts and market research widely predict that dial-up access will remain the dominant method of connecting to the Internet among residential consumers and small businesses for the foreseeable future. Broadband access will be attractive for some users and some applications." ( OFTEL, 2001, p.11) From this rather short run perspective the local loops of the established carriers are still -at least to some extent -monopolistic bottlenecks, with a consequent need for sector specific regulations (price cap, accounting separation, discrim inatory free entry). 2 Alternative providers of broadband access (e. g. CATV networks)
are not yet able to discipline the market power of the established provider of the local loop. Line sharing obligations, focussing on the stimulation of broadband access are, however, superfluous from the perspective of this lowspeed access market.
But line sharing regulations seem also not justified from the perspective of broadband Internet access. From the longer run dynamic perspective of convergence, the separation of the Internet into a large narrowband part on one hand, 2 Even from the traditional perspective of narrowband access there does exist a potential for phasing out sector-specific regulation in local telecommunications networks due to the gradual disappearance of monopolistic bottlenecks (cf. KNIEPS, 1997, pp. 331) . It is traditionally assumed that local networks, in contrast to long-distance networks, constitute monopolistic bottlenecks, for which neither active nor potential substitutes are available. To the extent and as long as local networks constitute monopolistic bottlenecks, ex ante regulation seems justified. Non-discriminatory access to essential facilities has to be guaranteed. However, it is important to view the application of the essential facilities doctrine in a dynamic context. Therefore, an objective in the formulation of access conditions must be to not impede infrastructure competition, i. e., to not destroy incentives for either research and development activities, or innovation and investment. In this way a balance between service and infrastructure competition is reached. Competitive conditions cannot be expected to change simultaneously in all local loops. Therefore it is necessary to examine at regular intervals which subclasses of local loops still constitute monopolistic bottlenecks and in which subclasses of local loops there is already workable active and/or potential competition, e. g., because of wireless local loop facilities.
and a rather marginal broadband part on the other seems artificial. For the development of the innovation potential for data intensive Internet services broadband access is indispensable. Whereas the local loop of copper pairs can provide, via xDSL, one broadband access possibility, there also exist economically feasible access alternatives (see fig. 2 ). In particular, mobile Internet access based on GPRS (General Packet Radio System Standard) as well as UMTS demonstrate the large innovation potential and evolution of mobile technologies for the Internet (e. g. BÜLLINGEN, STAMM, 2001 , BÜLLINGEN, WÖRTER, 2000 . Source: OFTEL, 2001, p. 56 From the perspective of high-speed broadband access, the local loops of the established telecommunication carriers therefore loose the characteristics of a monopolistic bottleneck. Alternative broadband access technologies (cable modem, UMTS, mobile access etc.) create economically sensible alternatives to xDSL. Due to the increasing importance of product differentiation, based on the different network characteristics of these access technologies, the long run convergence towards a single globally dominating access technology seems unrealistic. As a consequence, sector-specific regulation of broadband access -in particular line sharing obligations -seems superfluous.
Neither from the (short run) perspective of narrowband Internet access nor from the (longer run) perspective of broadband Internet access does the recent introduction of line sharing regulation by the FCC as well as the European Parliament therefore seem justified. The provision of xDSL-based service by a competitive local exchange carrier (LEC) and voiceband service by an incumbent LEC on the same loop is called "line sharing" by the FCC. The FCC decision to unbundle the high frequency portion of the loop was issued in December 1999.
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The regulation of the European Parliament and the Council of December 5, 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop 4 also entails line sharing:
"'shared access to the local loop' means the provision of access to the non-voice frequency spectrum of a copper line over which the basic telephone service is being provided to the end-user by the incumbent operator allowing a new entrant to deploy technologies -such as asymmetrical digital subscriber line (ADSL) systems -to provide the end-user with additional services such as high-speed internet access".
The question whether broadband Internet access and narrowband Internet access belong into one large Internet access market was controversial in recent antitrust cases dealing with AT&T-Media One and AOL-Time Warner mergers. Here the controversy was not whether the traditional local loop of telecommunications carriers would constitute a monopolistic bottleneck, but whether DSL or satellite-based Internet service will be able to offer close substitutes for cable-based Internet services in the short run (within a two years time horizon). The propo-nents of the one large Internet access market approach argued that "residential broadband cable modem internet access" is not a relevant market because of the intense deployment of DSL by both incumbent and competitive local exchange carriers (LEC's), and additional competition from providers employing other technologies and networks (such as satellite and fixed wireless) (ORDOVER, WILLIG, 1999, pp.7) . Since the existing digital loop carrier (DLC) 5 cannot support DSL service without additional investment -the carrier must install digital subscriber line access multiplier (DSLAM) termination at the DLC -it has been argued by the opponents of the one large Internet access market approach that this additional investment may impede DSL's ability to compete with cablebased broadband Internet access within a two years time horizon (HAUSMAN, SIDAK, SINGER, 2001, p. 150) . Due to the economically feasible alternatives of access to the Internet this controversy did, however, not come to the conclusion that residential broadband cable modem Internet access creates a bottleneck monopoly that is an essential facility in the relevant market of Internet access.
Internet backbones
In the following we shall differentiate between Internet service providers (ISPs), Internet backbone providers (IBPs) and suppliers of long distance networkcapacity (communications bandwidth). IBPs may be vertically integrated into the market for telecommunications inputs that underlie the services that backbones provide on one hand and with ISPs on the other hand. IBPs may be differentiated by the reach of their networks. There are regional and national backbones which may number from one to many in any given country. At the top level or tier 1 level of IP-connectivity only a limited number of companies (such as MCI/WorldCom, Sprint, AT&T and GTE) are operating (cf. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2000, p. 5).
Long distance network-capacity (communications bandwidth)
Access to the IP-based backbone network is impossible without access to telecommunications transport capacity, delivered e. g. by high-speed fiber optic networks, coaxial cables and satellite. The performance-price ratio for leadingedge optical communications technology has been improving rapidly. 
Internet backbone services
IBPs own or lease communications bandwidth that is connected by routers which the backbones use to deliver traffic to and from their customers. The underlying network logistics is the TCP/IP protocol. Whereas the IP (Internet protocol) is responsible for shifting the data packets from router to router, the TCP (transfer control protocol) is responsible for the reliability of transmission, i ncluding error correction. IBPs are also responsible for quality of service and network management, including the capacity control of the backbone network.
An additional dimension of Internet backbone services is the organization of interconnectivity with other IBPs by means of peering and transit arrangements.
Organization of interconnectivity: transit and peering
Each IBP forms its own network that enables all end users and content providers connected to it to communicate with each other. End users, however, often want to be able to communicate with a wide variety of end users and content providers, regardless of which IBPs are involved. In order to provide end users with such universal connectivity, IBPs must interconnect with one another to exchange traffic destined for each other's end users. It is this interconnection that makes the Internet the "network of networks".
One may differentiate between peering and transit arrangements. Peering partners exchange traffic on a settlement-free basis (bill and keep rule), that is, each peer terminates without charge the traffic originating with other peers. In contrast, with transit arrangements one IBP pays another IBP to transmit traffic between its customers and the customers of other IBPs (e. g. KENDE, 2000, p. 5) . Peering used to occur in the U.S. at public peering points, NAPs (network access points) 6 , where different backbones could exchange traffic. As the result of the increased congestion at the NAPs, IBPs turned to bilateral peering arrangements (private peering). Because each bilateral peering arrangement only allows backbones to exchange traffic destined for each other's customers, bac kbones need a significant number of peering arrangements in order to gain access to the full Internet. The alternative to peering is a transit arrangement between IBPs in which one IBP pays another IBP to deliver traffic between its customes and the customers of other backbones. Many IBPs have adopted a hybrid approach to interconnection, peering with a number of backbones and paying for transit from one or more IBPs in order to have access to the backbone of the transit supplier as well as the peering partners of the transit supplier.
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Transit and peering arrangements among IBPs are not subject to sector-specific regulations, neither by the Federal Communications Commission, nor by the regulatory agencies in Europe. The agreements that cover interconnection between IBPs are characterized by private negotiations and are subject to nondisclosure rules. From the economic theory of regulation it follows that there is indeed no need for ex ante regulation due to the absence of network specific market power. The input market of communications bandwidth is competitive and each IBP can develop its own logistic concept to optimize its own backbone and set of transit and peering arrangements. 
